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Liability for Leaving a Firearm Accessible
to Children
William C. Gargiulo*
HERE ARE A NUMBER of different reasons why the unhampered use
of firearms is important to Americans; for some it is hunting, target
shooting, or gun collecting, for others, the security resulting from having
a firearm around the house.' Furthermore, the rifle over the fireplace
is a traditional expression of American independence. Whatever the
reason, when a private citizen decides to exercise his right to possess
a firearm, he must accept the correlative duty attached to that right.
Enmeshed in the right to possess a firearm is the duty of care. At com-
mon law the liability for injury or damage to real or personal property
resulting from a breach of duty owed to a plaintiff is based upon some
moral or social fault.2 This concept of implied "oughtness," a violation
of which is the essence of culpability, asserts that one ought not inten-
tionally to cause harm to another, in the absence of a justifying privilege,
nor ought one act in a manner which exposes others to an unreasonable
risk of harm.3 Accordingly, the common law imposes a duty of care on
all to refrain from such conduct. 4 Thus, the duty of care applies not only
to using a firearm, but also to safeguarding the firearm from reasonably
anticipated improper use by others. The liability of a person for permit-
ting, or for leaving, a firearm accessible to children has been based upon
failure to exercise the required duty of care in regard to a dangerous
instrumentality.5
It is the objective of this note to consider whether or not the doc-
trine of absolute liability should be extended to hold that when a person
permits a child to have a firearm, or leaves one accessible to him, he is
absolutely liable for any injury or damage to real or personal property
that occurs after the firearm has been discharged by the child. The fol-
lowing facts, presented as they were reported in a newspaper, 6 will illus-
trate the problem:
* B.A., Ohio Univ.; Teacher, Wickliffe, Ohio, school system; Fourth-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 For a complete discussion of present firearms regulations see Note, 17 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 569 (1965).
2 Prosser, Torts 14 (2d ed. 1955).
3 Harper and Fleming, Law of Torts 785 (1956).
4 Harper and Fleming, op. cit. supra note 3.
5 See below, near text of note 22 of this article, which examines the liability of a
person for permitting or leaving a firearm accessible to children, based upon viola-
tion of a statute. As to pleading an action for firearm misuse, see, Oleck, Negligence
Forms of Pleading, Forms 44, 47, 101 (1957 rev.).
6 The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), July 5, 1968 at 1, col. 2.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968
LEAVING FIREARMS AND CHILDREN
A 20 year old mother (A) was killed by a blast from a 20-gauge
shotgun. A witness explained that the shot was fired by a two-year-
old child as his mother attempted to take the gun from him.
The shooting occurred in the bedroom of the home of the vic-
tim's boyfriend (B). B explained that he and A had walked into
the bedroom and were unknowingly followed by the two-year-old
child. B said he and A were standing next to a dresser when the
child slipped behind them and grabbed the loaded gun from the bed.
B said he did not notice the child until the boy's mother came into
the room and attempted to take the gun. The gun discharged.
The weapon belonged to C, a roommate of B; C kept the gun
for the protection of the household.
Considering only those factors pertinent to this discussion, the issues are
(1) should the court look at the facts of the case and say it is a question
for the jury to decide whether or not C, the owner of the gun, was negli-
gent in leaving a loaded firearm on a bed, or (2) should the court rule
as a matter of law that C is absolutely liable for the injury to A because
he was the owner of a firearm that was left accessible to a child, and
that that firearm in the possession of the child discharged, causing injury
to another.
The principle of absolute liability, varying as it does from the usual
policy of the common law that moral or social fault is a necessary char-
acteristic of conduct which may constitute the basis of tort liability, nec-
essarily is of limited extent.7 Notwithstanding the natural limitation,
the principle is being extended, both by common law and by statute, into
other fields.8 The extension is taking place, and probably will continue,
as new social viewpoints impose greater responsibilities upon defendants.9
In recent years, whenever a person permitted or left a firearm accessible
to a child and the child discharged the firearm causing injury, the "social
viewpoint" appeared to be that such a person was absolutely liable.
However, the courts have been unable to say outright that the defendant
was liable without any negligence.
Extending Absolute Liability in the Common Law
Unwilling to say outright that a person who permits or leaves a fire-
arm accessible to a child is liable without negligence for any injury
caused by the child when he discharges the weapon, the courts approach
7 Harper and Fleming, op. cit. supra note 3 at 778 which notes that the fact-types
of conduct which are included under the head of absolute liability are (1) liability
for the collection of dangerous quantities of substances not naturally on land; (2)
liability for blasting operations; (3) liability for trespassing animals; (4) liability
incident to the keeping of dangerous animals; (5) liability for the operation of air-
craft; (6) liability for some types of nuisance; (7) liability for some types of mis-
representations; (8) liability for the escape of fire originating on defendant's prem-
ises, and (9) poison sprays, insecticides, herbicides, defoliants. Also see Prosser, op.
cit. supra note 2 at 315.
8 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2 at 344.
9 Id. at 345.
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this result by falling back upon the concept of the scope of the original
risk which the person created. By doing this the courts are in accord
with the common law concept that legal liability should accompany
moral or social fault. Thus, the courts conclude that if a firearm is en-
trusted to a child, it easily may be foreseen that he may shoot himself
or another. 10 The person who entrusted the firearm to a child actually
recognized (or should have recognized) the unreasonableness of his con-
duct with respect to others."
Accordingly, leaving a loaded firearm in an unlocked drawer where
it was readily found by his twelve-year-old grandson, who proceeded
to shoot the plaintiff, his cousin, subjected a grandfather to negligence
liability. The court stated that the duty imposed upon one possessing
a loaded firearm encompasses all those persons who might suffer harm
or injury from the fireman's discharge, and includes use not only by the
possessor himself, but by a child where the possessor knows or has rea-
son to know that the child may be likely to use the firearm in such a
manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.12 The lan-
guage of the court appears to be a tautological expression of absolute
liability.
A deeper probe into the court's reasoning for imputing liability to
the grandfather, other than the neglect of a wrongdoing child, was the
application to the facts of the legal theory of dangerous agency. The
court said that a higher degree of care is required in dealing with a
dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs of life or business; every
reasonable precaution suggested by experience and the known danger
ought to be taken.13 Any loaded firearm is a highly dangerous instru-
ment, and since its possession or use is attended by extraordinary danger,
any person having it in his possession or using it is bound to exercise
extraordinary care.1 4 The court then confirmed its inference of absolute
liability by adding that a person handling or carrying a loaded firearm
in the immediate vicinity of others is liable for its discharge, even though
the discharge is accidental and unintentional.' 5 The legal theory of dan-
gerous agency is absolute liability hidden in verbiage that says that when
10 Id. at 268.
11 Mantino v. Piercedale Supply Co., 338 Pa. 435, 13 A. 2d 51 (1940); Milton Bradley
Co. v. Cooper, 79 Ga. App. 302, 53 S.E. 2d 761 (1949); Anderson v. Settergren, 100
Minn. 313, 111 N.W. 279 (1907).
12 Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A. 2d 395 (1957). This case overruled Swanson
v. Crandall, 2 Pa. Super. 85, 39 Weekly Notes of Cases, Pa. 24 (1896) which held that
there was no negligence on the part of a person leaving a gun accessible to a child.
Accord, Davis v. Mack, 15 Ohio Op. 4, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 210 (1939); Souza v. Irome,
219 Mass. 273, 106 N.E. 998 (1914).
13 Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A. 2d 395 (1957).
14 Id.
15 Id.
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one deals with or disposes of an item dangerous in its nature, he must
foresee or ought to foresee that harm to another might occur.16
After a court establishes the rule that negligence is established by
showing that the defendant permitted a child to have a dangerous fire-
arm, or that he left such a firearm in a place where he should have fore-
seen that it would come into the possession of a child, the court will
liberalize the rule rather than apply the doctrine of absolute liability.
For example, a father placed his rifle in a corner in the kitchen, the car-
tridges for the rifle were left in his sweater pocket, and the sweater was
placed on a chair in the kitchen. While the father was sleeping during
the afternoon hours (he having a night job), his thirteen year old son,
who was not forbidden to use the rifle, nor instructed on its use, took
the rifle and was playing with the breech mechanism when the rifle dis-
charged, injuring a playmate. In an action against the father, the court
said that although no negligence of the defendant contributed to this
injury, his negligence was in the manner in which he disposed of the
rifle.1 7 He failed to take reasonable precautions in that he left the rifle
easily accessible to those too young to be entrusted with it.'"
A more liberal view, yet one that did not consider the doctrine of
absolute liability, was demonstrated on the following facts, which
brought judgment for the plaintiff. The action was for injuries due to
a shot fired by an eight year old boy. Evidence indicated that the rifle
belonged to the boy's older brother, that the father permitted the older
brother to take care of the rifle, and the older brother left it where the
younger boy could get it. The issue was: does the evidence support a
verdict against the father? The court held the evidence to warrant an
inference that the father was negligent and that his negligence was the
cause of the injury to the plaintiff.19
A court has even gone so far as to declare that the defendant owed
the public a duty not to permit his minor son to gain or to have posses-
sion of a gun.2 0 The defendant in this case was the father of a thirteen
year old boy, and allowed his son to get possession of a loaded rifle. The
son discharged the rifle, injuring the plaintiff.
16 "In principle, a manufacturer or other person owning or controlling a thing that
is dangerous in its nature or is in a dangerous condition, either to his knowledge or
as a result of his want of reasonable care in manufacture or inspection, who deals
with or disposes of that thing in a way that he foresees or in the exercise of reason-
able care ought to foresee will probably carry that thing into contact with some
other person, known or unknown, who will probably be ignorant of the danger, owes
a legal duty to every such person to use reasonable care to prevent injury." Lum-
mus, J., Carter v. Yardley and Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. 2d 693 (1946).
17 Sojka v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 200 N.E. 554 (1936).
Is Id.
19 Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 P. 356, 12 A.L.R. 809 (1921).
20 Salisbury v. Crudale, 41 R.I. 33, 102 A. 731 (1918).
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The actual judgments reached in each of the cases reviewed so far
do indeed conform to the modern sense of justice and can be praised;
i.e., the general view is that the possessor of a firearm who permitted or
left his firearm accessible to a child ought to be held liable for the injury
caused when the child discharged the firearm.21 However, it is difficult
to praise the language of those decisions that imply that absolute liability
is to govern. One wonders why the courts, in cases concerning the pos-
sessor of a firearm, should bind themselves solely to the moral and social
fault concept that liability lies when the defendant's conduct creates a
foreseeable and unreasonable risk to others. In determining liability, is
it too much to ask of a court that they consider all the relevant legal
theories, rather than play a game of logic with only one?
Extending Absolute Liability by Statute
Most courts are reluctant to extend statutory construction to abso-
lute liability where the legislature has not in fact said that a violator
is strictly liable. The courts will, however, declare that a statute was
designed for the protection of others, and that the statute fixes the legal
duty so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence
of negligence, or negligence per se.22 Consequently, permitting a child
to have a firearm in violation of a statute can be held to be negligence
per se. The negligence per se concept basically is a statutory construc-
tion, implying the imposition of an absolute duty for violation of which
there is no recognized excuse. Such statutory construction falls properly
under the head of absolute liability, rather than within basis of negli-
gence.23 Thus, some writers conclude that negligence need not be estab-
lished in order to determine liability for accidental injury caused by fire-
arms, where the person charged is violating the law in using the firearm,
or in permitting another to use his firearm, in a manner which produces
an injury.24
Although Schatter v. Bergen25 deals with the indiscriminate use of
an air gun, the case well illustrates the majority view concerning statu-
tory violations. In the Schatter case the parents violated a city ordi-
nance, which in part provided that it was unlawful for any person to
21 For a discussion of cases based on the premise that an infant is liable for his own
tort when a parent permits or leaves a firearm accessible to him see Hagerty v.
Powers, 66 Cal. 368, 5 P. 622 (1885); Figone v. Guisti, 43 Cal. App. 606, 185 P. 694
(1919); Lacker v. Ewald, 11 Ohio Dec. 337, 8 Ohio N.P. 204 (1901); Lopez v. Chewi-
wie, 51 N.M. 421, 186 P. 2d 512 (1947); Frellesen v. Colburn, 156 Misc. 254, 281 N.Y.S.
471 (1935).
22 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2 at 153 n. 91.
23 Id., at 159.
24 Mirabel and Levy, Law of Negligence 677 (1962).
25 Schatter v. Bergen, 185 Wash. 375, 55 P. 2d 344 (1936).
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shoot or discharge an air gun, and that it was unlawful for a parent to
permit the use of, or provide a child with, an air gun, by giving their
minor son an air gun. While the child was playing with the gun, the gun
discharged, injuring plaintiff by striking his eye. Upon these facts the
court ruled that a person's negligent act or omission, setting in operation
a train of occurrences resulting naturally in injury to another, is deemed
proximate cause thereof; e.g., violation of a city ordinance is negligence
per se.26 Any person violating the provisions of the ordinance is subject
to civil liability for any injury resulting as a natural and probable con-
sequence of the violation.
27
Reaffirming the concept of negligence per se for statutory violation
is implicit in the ruling of the court in the Kuhns case, which asserted
that the violation of a statute prohibiting anyone from wantonly or play-
fully pointing a firearm at another may be regarded as negligence per se,
even though the violator be a minor.
28
A statute which states that no person shall sell, barter, furnish, or
give to a minor under the age of seventeen years, an air gun, musket,
rifle, shotgun, revolver, pistol or other firearm, or ammunition therefor,
or being the owner or have charge or control thereof knowingly permit
it to be used by a minor under such age,29 can easily be construed as
providing that one who permits a child to use a firearm is absolutely
liable for any harm that might result when the child discharges the
weapon. Yet, such statutes have been applicable only to sellers of fire-
arms, and then, only under the legal theory of negligence per se.
A recent (December 7, 1967) Ohio case tested the extension of the
statute to someone other than a seller of firearms. 30 The defendant per-
mitted her ten year old son to use an air gun. Defendant knew that other
children visited her home to play with her son. A playmate took and
discharged the gun, at the plaintiff, another playmate, and damaged his
eye. The defendant was held liable under the above statute. The Ohio
Supreme Court said that that part of the Ohio Code which forbids the
owner or one having control of an air gun to knowingly permit its use
by a minor under seventeen imposes a specific rule of conduct designed
to protect others; and violation of such statute is negligence per se.31
The court added that the defendant's earlier negligence, i.e., permitting
her son to have the air gun, may be found to be a proximate cause of
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Kuhns v. Brugger, supra note 13.
29 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.06 (1962); Ind. Burns' Stat. § 10-4704 (1956 Repl.);
Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 148 § 39, 47 (1965); N.Y. Consol. Laws, Penal L. § 265.06 (1967);
Penn. Purdon's Stat. tit. 18 § 4628 (1963).
30 Taylor v. Webster, 12 Ohio St. 2d 53, 231 N.E. 2d 870 (1967); also see note, 19 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 802 (1968).
31 Id.
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the injury if, according to human experience and in the natural and
ordinary course of events, the defendant could reasonably have foreseen
that the intervening act was likely to happen.
32
Statutory construction which leads to the concept of negligence per
se further allows the courts to fall back upon the legal theory of proxi-
mate causation, rather than to step forward for reasons of sound social
policy. The very reason that such a statute is passed is that the legis-
lature contemplates that anyone younger than the minimum statutory
age does not, as a matter of law, have the maturity,33 mental capacity,34
disposition35 and experience ' 6 to properly understand the dangers of
using a firearm. Does it not follow that when a person violates a statute
intended to protect children, he should be held absolutely liable? Where
a statute is interpreted as intended to protect the class of persons in
which the plaintiff is included, against the risk of the type of harm which
has in fact occurred, the weight of authority holds that an unexcused
violation is negligence per se and that the court must so direct the jury.3 7
The standard of conduct has been fixed by the legislature, and "jurors
have no dispensing power by which to relax it." 38 One wonders if negli-
gence per se is absolute liability. If it is the public policy of the state
to protect children from injury to themselves and others, then the statute
should be construed to impose on violators nothing less than absolute
liability.
The Law in Ohio
The development of the law in Ohio, as to the liability of a person
for permitting or leaving a firearm accessible to a child, has not extended
to the legal theory of absolute liability. The Ohio courts, like others,
have been unwilling to say outright that a defendant in such cases is
liable without negligence. This survey, however, indicates the growing
social policy that when a person possesses a firearm, he should be held
absolutely liable for any injury that occurs when he permits or leaves
the firearm accessible to children.
32 Id.
33 Kuhns v. Brugger, supra note 13.
34 Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky. 226, 62 S.W. 1013 (1910); Bollinger v. Rader, 153 N.C.
488, 69 S.E. 497 (1910); see 67 C.J.S. 800, n. 21 (1950); also see 73 Case & Comment
42 (1968).
35 Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 P. 991 (1929); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39
A. 2d 51 (1944); Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, 161 S.E. 644 (1931); Ryley v.
Lafferty, District Court of Idaho, 45 F. 2d 641 (1930); 67 C.J.S. 799, n. 16 (1950);
also see Jacobs, Law of Accident, 303 (1937).
36 Siebert v. Morris, 252 Wis. 460, 32 N.W. 2d 239 (1948).
37 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2 at 161.
38 Id. at n. 70 (quotation from Cardozo).
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(1) A firearm is a dangerous agency, and as such is so recognized
in the law.40 Ohio is committed to the proposition that a rule of strict
accountability for the exercise of due care must be enjoined upon those
who handle firearms.
4 1
(2) A parent is not liable for the tort of a child.42 A parent can be
made liable for his child's tort based upon the elements of his own negli-
gence; it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show by some evidence that
the parent was negligent in permitting his child to be in possession of
a dangerous agency. 43 The court said in this decision that even though
the accident was grave and sad, there must be evidence to support the
defendant's liability, for the court cannot legislate. The rules respecting
the nonliability of the parent for the tort of the child have been well
established by the law.
44
(3) Where a person permitted a minor to keep a firearm which the
minor accidentally discharged, injuring another, the court stated that
a person is chargeable with negligence if from all the facts and circum-
stances he should have foreseen the probable danger.45 The rule for such
liability is based upon the ground of negligence of a person in permitting
the minor to have possession of a dangerous and deadly weapon, when
from his youth and inexperience it might reasonably be anticipated that
an injury would result. 46
(4) Permitting a child to have a firearm, or leaving a firearm acces-
sible to him, must be the proximate cause of injuries or damage caused
by the child's use of the firearm. A father was held not liable for the
wrongful act of his child in willfully and maliciously shooting a dog,
simply by reason of the fact that he carelessly and negligently left his
gun "exposed," when the father was not connected with the child's
wrongdoing actively or passively.47 Note: This case has not been over-
ruled by any court in Ohio; however, statutes passed since, make the
holding a nullity.48
(5) Statutory violations as to guns are negligence per se.49
40 Huber v. Collins, 38 Ohio Abs. 551, 50 N.E. 2d 906 (1942).
41 Id.
42 Joseph v. Peterson, 108 Ohio App. 559, 160 N.E. 2d 420 (1959).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Davis v. Mack, 15 Ohio Op. 4, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 210 (1939).
46 Id.
47 Lacker v. Ewald, 11 Ohio Dec. 337, 8 Ohio N.P. 204 (1901).
48 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.05 et seq. (1962).
49 Poe v. The Canton-Mansfield Dry Goods Co., 36 Ohio App. 395, 173 N.E. 237
(1929); Neff Lumber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of St. Clairsville, 122 Ohio St. 303, 171
N.E. 237 (1930); Taylor v. Webster, supra note 30.
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Conclusion
Sound social policy dictates that when a person possesses a firearm
and permits or leaves it accessible to a child, he must accept the respon-
sibility for any injury which might result when the child discharges the
weapon. Liability should be imposed not because of the moral and social
fault conception, but because possession of a firearm, though lawful, has
such a high potential of danger to others in our complex society. Why
not say that a possessor of a firearm "must keep it at his peril, and if he
does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage ." 50 that
might result?
A workable way to evaluate law is to view it as a means to an end.
Accordingly, the first step in determining what the law of a person's re-
sponsibility ought to be for permitting or leaving a firearm accessible to
a child, is to make a rational choice of a valid end. The rational choice
seems to be absolute liability because that will best protect society.
However, the courts are reluctant to extend absolute liability in the
common law or in the construction of statutes, because of the "feeling"
that that would be judicial legislation. Rather than legislate, when faced
with a defendant who was a possessor of a firearm that became acces-
sible to a child who discharged the weapon causing injury, the courts
weave a blanket of tautological verbiage around "foreseeability" and
"negligence per se" in order to find the defendant liable for the injury.
Thus it must be concluded that legislatures will have to dictate that
when a person possesses a firearm and permits or leaves it accessible to
a child, he must accept the responsibility for any injury which might
result when the child discharges the weapon. Only then may particular
statutes and decisions, considered as means, be selected or rejected.
When this is done, the enactment, interpretation and administration of
such legislation may be consciously directed toward the legal theory of
absolute liability.
50 Blackburn, J., Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866) affirmed in Rylands v.
Fletcher, L. R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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